5 things to know about why Zelensky fired Farmland Force Commander General Sodol

• Since the appointment of Lieutenant General Yuri Sodol in February there has been more than a slight mishandling of Ukrainian field operations.

Even though Ukrainian forces have succeeded in disrupting the chain and inflicting more casualties on the more powerful Russian army than they had in a four-and-a-half month period, all is not well. The Kremlin offensive, launched in the Kharkiv region in May, captured approximately 100 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory against minimal resistance. Russian media reported that some Ukrainian soldiers fled. Ukrainian media reported in forthcoming documents that there were no fortifications and powerful cavalry forces at all.

In the southern Dnipro River area, despite almost overwhelming Ukrainian drone superiority, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have struggled to provide a toehold bridgehead on the left side of the river – never mind expanding.

Ukrainian forces have attempted to launch small counter-offensives in various areas, although progress has been slow.

Critics have accused Sodol of overdoing that difficult situation by ordering a counter-attack without artillery and armor support, inflating Ukrainian casualties, and ordering a court-martial commission to find officers responsible for the disasters. Tried.

The biggest operational straw may have come in June, when Russian forces captured more territory in the eastern Pokrovsk sector.

• Sodol, the man who was fired, does not resemble President Volodymyr, a particularly senior military officer Zelensky Fall in love.

In more than two years of fighting, Ukraine’s president has repeatedly praised, and chosen more young officers who have enjoyed fresh battlefield experience for promotion. Zelensky had a long-running battle with client General Valery Zaluzny, led by Zaluzny’s insistence on using officers who had seen first-hand conflict with Russia in the 2014–21 period, and who would become senior generals until 2022. Had become command. According to news reports, the president’s relations with Zaluzny soured because Zaluzny refused to make a series of major attacks called for by the presidential leadership for political reasons, and perhaps, Zaluzny’s reputation among Ukrainian citizens.

Sodol, 53, an alumnus of the only combat-capable formation in the entire Ukrainian Army in 2014 (the Twenty-fifth Airborne Brigade), is a textbook consultant on “old school” management running the AFU in 2022, and thanks Zaluzny for his promotion. .

In 2024, when Zaluzny was dismissed, Sodol was put forward by the presidential leadership as the permanent officer who would improve AFU efficiency without overturning the entire military chain of command. One conceivable reason behind Sodol’s dismissal on June 24 could be that Zelensky’s perception of Sodol’s form and loyalty was not enough to take care of the situation at the entrance to the era for 4 months.

• Sodol’s replacement, General Andriy Hnatov, is exactly the kind of young military expert President Zelensky has said Ukraine needs to win the fight.

Similar to Sodol’s entire military career at a young age (14 years old), Hnatov started out in the army in tank forces, but in 2016 transferred to one of the lowest units in active combat with Russian forces at the time – the 36th Marine. Brigade – As a young officer and commanded the front line marines in wrestling within the southern Mariupol sector for the next 5 years.

Too young to be part of the cadre of senior officers manning the AFU at the start of Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Hnatov rose through the staff and leadership to eventually command Joint Forces South of Ukraine, where he was a A key officer in the hit defense of Mykolaiv, the liberation of Kherson and the daring sea assault of October 2023, he worked through his used brigade to build a bridge over the left bank of the Dnipro River.

In February, when Zelensky replaced Zaluzny, the Ukrainian president selected Hnatov as one of five battle-tested leaders representing the most accomplished young wrestling commanders produced by the AFU.

Amidst Ukraine’s multi-million-member military volunteer movement – ​​all of whom are likely Zelensky citizens – the purge of the region and a new, more youthful day of generals like Hnatov is largely backed by Soviet-trained senior officers. .

• Some Ukrainian media are pushing the idea that Zelensky has decided that he cannot use generals who do not send influence, or do not focus on frontline troops.

Yuri Butusov, one of Ukraine’s highest-profile military journalists, in a Wednesday editorial praised Sodol’s combat record and personal bravery and personal aura when commanding small units in combat. In the same appearance, Butusov criticized Sodol for failing to adapt the AFU field forces across the board to the environment, and resorting to written instructions, military police investigations, and blackmail in exchange for significant and organized assistance to agricultural commanders. took.

Butusov noted that even though Sodol had served tactically as a frontline officer, when promoted to a senior management position Sodol attempted to run an entire army with top-down orders and placed himself on the frontline. Kept deliberately ignorant of the situation. Butusov argued that a man promoted by his own talent unfairly trades vital troops in a war, and that doing so was Zelensky’s process.

Major news outlet Ukrainska Pravda expressed almost identical views in an analytical article, but also suggested that Sodol may have chosen to take responsibility for military shortcomings, so that the Zelensky leadership could not prosecute its friends. Sodol had reacted poorly to criticism following his dismissal. The Kyiv Post was unwilling to touch it.

• Sodol certainly ran away from a slight weakness in that the AFU is a fighting force of volunteers who are ready to fight and sacrifice, but not always, blindly follow orders or be the best squad.

According to most Ukrainian main media, the catalyst for Sodol’s expulsion was a mob letter written by Bohdan Krotevich, a vice commander of the Twelfth National Shield Brigade – the Azov Regiment famous from the Mariupol siege – which involved the Azov officer issuing criminal orders on Sodol. , demanding the use of military police and prosecutors to punish subordinates unwilling to follow orders, and accusing the war of giving priority to Ukrainian control over things on the map in exchange for reducing losses. . In most NATO armies an officer firing a rush charge in wartime would be arrested for insubordination – minimum. By the month, Krotevitch was no longer approved. Politically influential figures affiliated with Zelensky (i.e., bloggers with thousands of fans) echoed Krotevich’s accusations, effectively arguing that the Azov official had the status at best and was far from the primary presence that created an agricultural The officer had more serious complaints about the generals’ lack of focus on reducing casualties and on front-line commanders instead of exercising self-discipline and getting their orders carried out. Presumably, when faced with breaking down the groups supporting Sodol, the AFU’s chain of command, and strict military discipline, or leading a mob battle with the Azov Regiment and its supporters and replacing Sodol with someone more youthful, Zelensky Chose closing.