Is an Israel-Hezbollah fight inevitable? , accountable governance

The exchange of gunfire between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah, lasting more than 8 months, has intensified in recent weeks. The situation could escalate into a full-blown fight in one of two ways.

One is to force the current tit-for-tat out of management in a way that neither of them is planning. The escalation may be the result of each side’s fatally good judgment in trying to stave off the opponent’s age-related attacks by strongly responding to the latest attack.

An alternative path to escalation could be a deliberate preemption by one side to a full-scale fight. Hezbollah is unlikely to be that factor. Hezbollah has made it clear that everything it is doing to heat up the Israeli-Lebanese border is to comfort the beleaguered Palestinians of the Gaza Strip and to aid Hamas. Hezbollah feels that the negative internet will benefit from an all-out war with Israel. In the most recent such battle in 2006, the gang may have claimed some fortunes in reputation as the most sophisticated military power in the Middle East, but paid a substantial price in human and materiel costs. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah expressed regret at the cross-border violence that culminated in the fighting.

On the other hand, Israel could have come to the decision to wage full-scale war in Lebanon within a few months, if the situation out of control had not already materialized. Environment Secretary Antony Blinken reportedly told Arab officials during his latest visit to the region that he believes Israel intends to invade Lebanon. Such an attack would not be consistent with any clear and objective study of what would be in the best interests of Israeli security. It may also be an issue of internal political and emotional factors riding on Israeli conduct.

An aggravating factor is the situation of approximately 60,000 Israelis who have been displaced from their properties due to the deteriorating security situation in northern Israel and are housed in Tel Aviv resorts or other temporary housing. They constitute a significant political force in a bid to do something to allow their return. Ultimately, the outbreak of a full-scale war with Hezbollah would worsen the security situation in northern Israel, at least for life. However, it is futile to expect that competitive military action will somehow maintain a long-term state of non-violence in the North, which is a strength point for the government.

Top Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s personal political and criminal status is still a major determinant of Israeli coverage in this factor, among other factors. It has become generally accepted that Netanyahu’s reserves of power and most likely his ability to avoid corruption charges will last as long as Israel is at war. With Netanyahu himself recently declaring that “the intensive phase of the war with Hamas is about to end”, his stake in an all-out battle at the northern entrance is almost certainly more powerful than ever.

Netanyahu’s tenure also depends on maintaining his ruling coalition with far-right extremists, primarily Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, neither of whom has any concerns regarding the use of military force against Hezbollah. Are fundamentalists. Smotrich has called for a military offensive inside Lebanon if Hezbollah does not meet blackmail for the withdrawal of its forces from southern Lebanon. Ben Gvir says that Smotrich’s demand also does not amount to much, and that Israel would have to create a military campaign aimed at completely destroying Hezbollah.

An additional issue is the perception within Israel that southern Lebanon is part of “Greater Israel” that used to be a gift from God, and is now fair game not only for military conquest but also for complementary Jewish settlement. The concept has been on the fringes of Israeli concept, although as with many alternative ending concepts in Israel, it shows signs of going mainstream.

The truth is that the Netanyahu government’s stated objective is to “destroy” Hamas in the Gaza Strip – as even the Israeli military’s official spokesperson now admits– Succeeding would create a source of frustration that could also help motivate attacks on Lebanon. This also includes the disappointment of not being able to bring many Israeli hostages back to life. An operation that could cause serious harm to Israel’s other Arab adversaries and could be described as aimed at letting displaced civilians of northern Israel return to their homes would receive the most urgency among both policymakers and Israeli society. Can help to complete. To do “something” in the face of the setbacks and disappointments of the Tide disaster.

Israel’s tragic campaign in the Gaza Strip, which has gone far beyond anything else that could be construed as defense or even focused on Hamas, has been more terror than strategic – Hamas A long spasm of excitement over the terror carried out by 7 October. This trend will be prolonged by increased fighting in Lebanon. The fact that Hezbollah (and the alternative Lebanese) are Arabs and that Hezbollah has been a common rival of Israel may be a major reason for the expansion of the conflict in the minds of many frustrated and angry Israelis.

To the extent that genuine strategic concerns would be behind an Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the primary objective would no longer be to break Hezbollah – which is a way out of reach – but to push its forces out of the part of Lebanon south of Litani. River. The accompanying rhetoric would describe such an effort as allegedly buying long-term security for northern Israel.

The long, bloody history of Israeli military involvement in Lebanon strongly suggests that such security can be bought negatively. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978, and again in 1982, reaching Beirut. It continued to occupy southern Lebanon until 2000. And yet, Hezbollah is as strong today as it has ever been. Hezbollah first rose to prominence after the 1982 invasion as the group was making every effort to defend Lebanon against Israeli incursions. Its prevalent support continues to be based largely on the perceived need for such security – a perception that any new Israeli aggression would encourage.

The Israel–Hezbollah war of 2006 provides an idea of ​​what a fresh war would look like, although the latest war is perhaps even more dangerous. Hezbollah’s capacity for aerial bombardment of Israel is now greater than before. However the collection of rockets and missiles in its arsenal is estimated at roughly 150,000. Even simple projectiles could do a lot of damage if they overwhelmed Israel’s sophisticated wind defense machine through numbers alone. Undoubtedly, Israel would be progressive in the other direction in causing at least as much death and destruction as it absorbed itself.

The Biden leadership really and rightly does not want to see a new Israel-Hezbollah conflict now. On the other hand, its peacekeeping efforts have little chance of luck. Even though UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which aimed to get to the bottom of the 2006 war but was never fully implemented, provides a framework for a possible new resolution, one of these resolutions The necessary conditions are difficult to achieve. The suggestions that US envoy Amos Hochstein is discussing with Israeli and Lebanese officials are aimed at distancing the Israel-Lebanon equation from what is happening in the Gaza Strip. Given the ongoing state of emergency in Gaza and the harmful environment created by Hezbollah’s posture of comfortably maintaining power alongside the Gaza Palestinians, this will not be possible.

Management’s declarative policy does not support the prospects of a comfortable solution and will almost certainly make the issues worse. Hochstein reportedly informed Arab officials in Beirut that if full-scale fighting broke out on the Israeli-Lebanese border, the United States would assist Israel. The management has given the same message to Israeli officials also. Such messaging does nothing to deter Hezbollah’s competitive conduct, it encourages such conduct through Israel.

If any of these wars break out, like the Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip, the United States will be proudly considered the owner of the war in much of the region. And with that confidence comes all the relevant ill-effects for American interests, including humiliation, diplomatic isolation, and the desire for revenge through violent elements. Additionally, the management’s stance will not bolster the long-term security of the Israeli voters it is supposedly trying to help.